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The Impact of Prosecutorial
Misconduct, Overreach, and Misuse of
Discretion on Gender Violence Victims
Leigh Goodmark*
ABSTRACT
Prosecutors are failing victims of gender violence as wit-
nesses and when they become defendants in cases related to their
own victimization.  But it is questionable whether that behavior
should be labeled misconduct.  The vast majority of these behav-
iors range from misuses of discretion to things that some might
consider best practices in handling gender violence cases.  None-
theless, prosecutors not only fail to use their discretion appropri-
ately in gender violence cases, but they take affirmative action
that does tremendous harm in the name of saving victims and
protecting the public.  The destructive interactions prosecutors
have with victims of gender violence are not aberrations, or
merely the poor choices of a few “bad apples,” but a result of
overreliance on the criminal legal system to address intimate
partner violence.  These choices also reflect the extent to which
prosecutors have embraced the stereotype of the “perfect vic-
tim.”  The operation of absolute immunity for actions that prose-
cutors undertake in the context of their roles as advocates
ensures that some actions—including arresting victims, mislead-
ing courts, and filing retaliatory cases against victims—are up-
held by courts, though these actions might appear to be
misconduct to those outside the justice system.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 2, 2014, Renata Singleton’s boyfriend, Vernon
Crossley, grabbed Ms. Singleton’s cell phone during an argument
and destroyed the phone.1  The police were called and arrested
Crossley.2  Shortly thereafter, the Orleans Parish District Attor-
ney’s Office contacted Ms. Singleton.3  Ms. Singleton informed the
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office that she was not inter-
ested in participating in prosecution.  Ms. Singleton had three chil-
dren and a new job.  She did not want to spend what little spare
time she had on a criminal case involving a man with whom she was
no longer involved.4  Nonetheless, on April 21, 2015, the Orleans
Parish District Attorney’s Office delivered two “subpoenas” to Ms.
Singleton, ordering her to speak with the District Attorney’s Office
on April 24, 2015.  The documents stated, “A FINE AND IMPRIS-
ONMENT MAY BE IMPOSED FOR FAILURE TO OBEY THIS
NOTICE.”5  Those “subpoenas,” however, were not legally binding
documents issued by a court.  Instead, the documents were
fabricated by the District Attorney’s office, designed “to coerce vic-
tims and witnesses into submitting to interrogations by prosecutors
outside of court.”6  After a friend in law enforcement told Ms. Sin-
1. Complaint & Jury Demand at 33, Singleton v. Cannizzaro, No. 2:17-CV-
10721 (E.D. La. Oct. 17, 2017) [hereinafter Complaint & Jury Demand].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. at 33–34.
5. Sarah Stillman, Why Are Prosecutors Putting Innocent Witnesses in Jail?,
NEW YORKER (Oct. 17, 2017), https://bit.ly/2ywWVAv [https://perma.cc/M3KD-
Q8W3].
6. Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 2.  For a photograph of one of
these documents, see Tim Morris, District Attorney’s ‘Fake Subpoenas’ Degrade the
Legal Process, NOLA.COM (Apr. 27, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Be4JaZ [https://perma.cc/
657X-3V9P].
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gleton that she had not been properly served with a subpoena, Ms.
Singleton decided not to attend the meeting.7  On April 24, 2015,
Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney, Arthur Mitchell, asked
the Orleans Parish Criminal District Court to jail Ms. Singleton as a
“material witness.”8  Mitchell told the court that Ms. Singleton
failed to appear pursuant to a valid subpoena.9  Judge Robin Pitt-
man issued an arrest warrant and set Ms. Singleton’s bond at
$100,000.  Judge Pittman based Ms. Singleton’s bond on Mitchell’s
statements to the court.10
On May 29, 2015, aware of the outstanding warrant for her ar-
rest, Ms. Singleton went to the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s
Office and told Mitchell that she would not answer questions with-
out an attorney present.11  Mitchell responded, “You’re the victim.
You don’t get a lawyer.”12  Ms. Singleton was arrested, handcuffed,
and taken to the Orleans Parish Prison.13  This arrest was Ms. Sin-
gleton’s first, and she was afraid for herself, for her children, who
had been left without a parent in the house, and for her new job,
which she worried she would lose.14  Because Ms. Singleton could
not pay the $100,000 bond, she remained in Orleans Parish Prison
for the next five days.15  On June 2, 2015, Ms. Singleton finally ap-
peared before a judge—dressed in an orange jumpsuit, shackled
hand and foot, chained to the other people appearing before the
court that day.16  She was released on a reduced bond of $5,000 and
given a curfew and an ankle monitor.17
Mr. Crossley, who was arrested for destroying Ms. Singleton’s
phone, had a different experience with the justice system.  His bond
was initially set at $3,500.18  Crossley paid the bond and was re-
leased on the day that he was arraigned.19  He pled guilty to two
misdemeanors.20  He did no jail time.21  And because he pled guilty,
7. Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 34.
8. See infra Part I.C.
9. Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 34.
10. Id. at 35.
11. See id. at 35–36.
12. Stillman, supra note 5.
13. Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 36.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3.
16. Id. at 37.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 3.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
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the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office never needed Ms. Sin-
gleton to testify against him.22
Renata Singleton was not the only victim of gender violence23
subjected to arrest and incarceration as a result of a material wit-
ness warrant in Orleans Parish.  The Orleans Parish District Attor-
ney’s Office requested and received material witness arrest
warrants for a victim of child sex trafficking, who was held for 89
days, and a rape victim, held for 12 days.24  In some cases, these
victims were held in the same prisons as those arrested for crimes
against them.25
Orleans Parish District Attorney Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr. de-
fended his office’s use of what some would call extreme tactics to
compel witness cooperation.  When asked about jailing victims of
rape as material witnesses, Cannizzaro responded, “If I have to put
a victim of a crime in jail, for eight days, in order to . . . keep the
rapist off of the street, for a period of years and to prevent him
from raping or harming someone else, I’m going to do that.”26  Can-
nizzaro described the use of arrest as an “inconvenience.”27  A
spokesman for his office maintained that in some cases, the only
alternative to making an arrest is dismissal of the case, which the
office will not do.28  Cannizzaro specifically justified the request for
an arrest warrant in one domestic violence case on the grounds that
the victim was no longer cooperating with prosecutors.29
Orleans Parish Assistant District Attorney Chris Bowman de-
scribed the use of fraudulent subpoenas as office “policy,” explain-
ing that “[m]aybe in some places if you send a letter on the DA’s
22. Id. at 37.
23. Gender violence refers to harm that is inflicted as a result of a person’s
gender, gender identity, or gender expression, or is created or exacerbated by gen-
der hierarchy or gender-related privilege or oppression.  Leigh Goodmark, CON-
VERGEing Around the Study of Gender Violence: The Gender Violence Clinic at
the University of Maryland Carey School of Law, 5 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC. JUST.
L. REV. 661, 662–63 (2015).
24. Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 29–30.  The victim of child
sex trafficking lost her housing and custody of her child as a result of being incar-
cerated. See id.
25. See Joel Gunter, Why Are Crime Victims Being Jailed?, BBC News (May
6, 2017), https://bbc.in/2ScEX0a [https://perma.cc/SF8A-MBHG].
26. Jenavieve Hatch, District Attorney Defends Jailing Rape Victims Who
Won’t Testify, HUFFPOST (Apr. 29, 2017), https://bit.ly/2DOoXd3 [https://perma.cc/
G9LG-G2WD].
27. Gunter, supra note 25.
28. Stillman, supra note 5.
29. Charles Maldonado, Orleans Parish Prosecutors Are Using Fake Subpoe-
nas to Pressure Witnesses to Talk to Them, LENS (Apr. 26, 2017), https://bit.ly/
2S0WSYD [https://perma.cc/5RDF-HYPP].
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letterhead that says, ‘You need to come in and talk to us,’ . . . that is
sufficient.  It isn’t here.  That is why [it] looks as formal as it
does.’”30  Cannizzaro claimed that no one had ever been arrested as
a result of the failure to comply with a fraudulent subpoena.31  The
federal lawsuit filed on behalf of Renata Singleton and other crime
victims alleges that at least ten arrest warrants were issued based on
prosecutors’ assertions that witnesses had failed to appear in re-
sponse to these subpoenas, and six witnesses were jailed.32
The Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office’s policy of using
fake subpoenas to justify the arrest of material witnesses is extreme.
But Cannizzaro is at the outer reaches of a long line of prosecutors
using legal process to compel victim participation in cases involving
gender violence.33  Prosecutors justify these tactics in two ways: ei-
ther by claiming that the rule of law and public safety demand that
victims of gender violence participate in prosecution, or by assert-
ing a desire to safeguard the victim—to save the victim’s life.  This
spectrum of prosecutorial overreach is the most extreme manifesta-
tion of the ongoing push to take gender violence “seriously.”34
That push seems to end, however, when victims become de-
fendants.  Orleans County provides another example.  In March
2005, Catina Curley shot and killed her husband, Renaldo Curley,
after Mr. Curley physically and emotionally abused both Ms.
Curley and her children for a decade.35  Mr. Curley kicked Ms.
Curley so hard that he dislocated her shoulder.36  He broke her
nose.37  He attempted to push Ms. Curley out of a moving car.38  He
strangled Ms. Curley while hitting her in the face.39  Mr. Curley also
bit Ms. Curley, leaving visible marks on her skin.40  Ms. Curley’s
children could not count how many times they had seen their father
30. Id.
31. See Complaint & Jury Demand, supra note 1, at 17 (citing Paul Murphy,
Practice of Fake Subpoenas to Be Stopped by Orleans DA, 4WWL (Apr. 27, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2RwIi5S [https://perma.cc/S65A-Y74P]).
32. Id.
33. See infra Part I.
34. LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND
THE LEGAL SYSTEM 110–13 (2012) [hereinafter GOODMARK, A TROUBLED
MARRIAGE].
35. Josie Duffy Rice, New Orleans Woman Sentenced to Life in Prison for
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abuse their mother.41  When Ms. Curley tried to call the police, Mr.
Curley broke her phone.42  Nonetheless, Ms. Curley was well-
known to the police.  In 11 years, police had filed six reports as a
result of Mr. Curley’s violence towards his wife.43
On the night Ms. Curley shot her husband, Mr. Curley shoved
her onto the bed, threw a soda can at her, and said, “Bitch, you
going to make me hurt you.”44  Ms. Curley called family members
for help, but could not leave the house because her keys were in the
same room as Mr. Curley.45  With nowhere to go, she took Mr.
Curley’s revolver out from under the mattress, knowing that Mr.
Curley would come after her.46  When he did, Ms. Curley thought,
“If he gets close enough to me, he is going to take this gun from me
and he is going to beat me again.”47  As Mr. Curley continued to
advance, Ms. Curley fired one shot.48  The shot hit Mr. Curley in
the chest and killed him.49
Catina Curley was charged with second-degree murder as a re-
sult of her husband’s death.50  Prosecutors argued that Ms. Curley
was not afraid of Mr. Curley; after all, she had not asked her family
to come to the house or called the police.51  Not only did Ms.
Curley’s lawyer not put on evidence about the violence Ms. Curley
experienced, Ms. Curley’s lawyer did not even explore whether
such evidence might be beneficial to the case.52  Ms. Curley was
convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole.53
In 2018, however, Ms. Curley’s sentence was overturned.54
The Louisiana Supreme Court found that Ms. Curley’s counsel had
been ineffective and ordered a new trial.55  Ms. Curley was released
on $1,000 bond, over the objections of the Orleans Parish District
Attorney’s Office.  District Attorney Cannizzaro said that the















55. State v. Curley, 2016-1708, p. 21 (La. 6/27/18); 250 So. 3d 236, 250.
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ing, and unprecedented.”56  Cannizzaro made it clear that his office
would continue to prosecute Ms. Curley aggressively: “This woman
already was found guilty of deliberately killing someone with a gun-
shot to the chest.  The [Louisiana] Supreme Court did not exoner-
ate her of committing murder.  It only ordered that a new trial be
held.”57
Prosecutors in Orleans County and in jurisdictions all over the
United States are failing victims of gender violence, both as wit-
nesses and when they become defendants in cases related to their
own victimization.  But it is questionable at best whether that be-
havior should be labeled “misconduct.”58  While some interactions
between prosecutors and victims of gender violence certainly con-
stitute misconduct, the vast majority of these behaviors range from
misuses of discretion to things that some might consider best prac-
tices in handling gender violence cases.  And the operation of abso-
lute immunity for actions that prosecutors undertake in the context
of their roles as advocates59 ensures that some actions—including
arresting victims, misleading courts, and filing retaliatory cases
against victims—are upheld by courts, though these actions might
appear to be misconduct to those outside the justice system.  Prob-
lematic prosecution policy in the context of gender violence is not,
strictly speaking, misconduct.
The destructive interactions prosecutors have with victims of
gender violence are not aberrations, or merely the poor choices of a
few “bad apples”; instead, such choices are the product of the push
to criminalize intimate partner violence over the last 40 years.60
These choices also reflect the extent to which prosecutors have em-
braced the stereotype of the “perfect victim,” whose meekness en-
sures that she will accede to the prosecutor’s requests to testify and
who never fights back.61  Prosecutors not only fail to use their dis-
56. Rice, supra note 35.
57. See Ramon Antonio Vargas, $1,000 Bail Set for New Orleans Woman
Given New Trial on Charge that She Murdered Abusive Husband, NEW ORLEANS
ADVOC. (June 29, 2018), https://bit.ly/2Wzg5ix [https://perma.cc/M2RP-5P5F].
58. Prosecutorial misconduct includes failure to provide discovery, overcharg-
ing, witness tampering, suborning perjury, improper jury selection, improper argu-
ment, and the introduction of improper evidence.  H. Mitchell Caldwell, The
Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a Modest Proposal, 63 CATH
U. L. REV. 51, 60–68 (2013). Witness tampering includes attempts to influence the
testimony of a witness, intimidation of witnesses, and misrepresentation of infor-
mation to witnesses, all of which occur in gender violence cases. See infra Part I.
59. See infra Part III.
60. See LEIGH GOODMARK, DECRIMINALIZING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A BAL-
ANCED POLICY APPROACH TO INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 14–15 (2018).
61. See generally Leigh Goodmark, When Is a Battered Woman Not a Battered
Woman? When She Fights Back, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 75 (2008).
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cretion appropriately in gender violence cases, but they take affirm-
ative action that does tremendous harm in the name of saving
victims and protecting the public.  What that harm looks like, how
prosecutors are immunized from the consequences of that harm,
and what we might do about it are the subject of this Article.
I. VICTIMS OF GENDER VIOLENCE AS WITNESSES
The interactions prosecutors have with victims of gender vio-
lence are shaped by the context in which those interactions occur.
When victims of gender violence are witnesses in criminal prosecu-
tions, the relationship the prosecutor has with those witnesses is
colored by the prosecutor’s own attitude about gender violence,
concern about winning cases, and office policies that mandate a
particular approach to gender violence cases.  These factors can
combine to create an atmosphere in which prosecutors justify ignor-
ing, disregarding, or mistreating victims of gender violence if neces-
sary to win cases.
A. Prosecutorial Attitudes Towards Gender Violence
Prosecutors who doggedly pursue gender violence cases have
different motivations.  Some attorneys become prosecutors specifi-
cally because of a desire to combat gender-based violence.62  As
Cheyna Roth, a former prosecutor, writes, “I graduated from law
school ready to make a difference for abused women.”63  The desire
to protect abused women is often shaped by stereotypes about vic-
tims of violence.  Victims of violence are expected to be meek, pas-
sive, compliant, and non-violent,64 waiting to be rescued from their
violent partners by the “good guys” in law enforcement.  Victims of
violence are also expected to be willing to do whatever prosecutors
ask in service of prosecutors’ attempts to keep them safe.  Prosecu-
tors sometimes see themselves as saving victims of gender violence,
even when, or particularly when, victims seem unwilling or unable
to save themselves.65  Honolulu prosecutor Keith Kaneshiro de-
62. E.g., Cheyna Roth, ‘I Feel Like a Fraud’: Confessions of a Broken-Down
Domestic Violence Lawyer, VICE (July 7, 2016), https://bit.ly/2RgOU8z [https://per
ma.cc/CY2X-8PRL].
63. Id.
64. Goodmark, supra note 61, at 83.
65. See, e.g., Alex Barber, Prosecutor Orders Arrest of Woman as Material
Witness to Testify Against Her Alleged Abuser, BANGOR DAILY NEWS (Sept. 20,
2013), https://bit.ly/2ReoDrl [https://perma.cc/4FTA-3UZU]; Kate Barcellos, Tak-
ing the Call: Legal System Aims to Tackle Domestic Violence, RUTLAND HERALD
(Aug. 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/2sPhlk9 [https://perma.cc/AJ24-RYFV]; Roth, supra
note 62; Joann Snoderly, Kodiak District Attorney Sets Sights on Domestic Vio-
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scribed his office’s work as doing “a lot of things to help victims of
domestic violence, even when the victims did not know what’s good
for them.”66
Zealous prosecution may also have more self-directed motives.
Prosecutors pursue gender violence cases because prosecutors are
concerned with maintaining law and order67 or because prosecutors
fear the political ramifications of appearing not to take gender vio-
lence seriously.68  In her study of New York City’s misdemeanor
courts, law professor Issa Kohler-Hausmann found that prosecutors
were concerned that the failure to take every possible precaution in
a case involving intimate partner violence could result in future vio-
lence, which could in turn lead to questions being asked about how
avidly the prosecutor pursued the original case.69  Prosecutors want
to insulate themselves from political consequences in the event that
violence recurs.  As one assistant district attorney told Kohler-
Hausmann, prosecutors pursue cases involving intimate partner vio-
lence “because it covers, they see it as covering their backs. . . . On
the off chance that something happens again, it’s not their fault;
they tried to prosecute it.”70
lence, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 6, 2018), https://bit.ly/2RNLpM3 [https://
perma.cc/65L8-XGRP].
66. Rebecca McCray, Jailing the Victim: Is It Ever Appropriate to Put Some-
one Behind Bars to Compel Her to Testify Against Her Abuser?, SLATE (July 12,
2017), https://bit.ly/2uS25CR [https://perma.cc/RE7Y-PC2H]; see also ANGELA J.
DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 67–68
(2007) (describing her interaction with a domestic violence prosecutor: “The prose-
cutor went on to say that she had a duty to fight domestic violence and that she
was going to fulfill that duty, with or without Mrs. Jefferson’s help”).
67. See Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should Victims
Be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 383, 402–03 (2001); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
68. See JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERA-
TION AND HOW TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 89, 140, 168 (2017). Pfaff notes, how-
ever, that there is little research on why prosecutors make the choices that they
make. Id. at 134.
69. ISSA KOHLER-HAUSMANN, MISDEMEANORLAND: CRIMINAL COURTS AND
SOCIAL CONTROL IN AN AGE OF BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 209–10 (2018).
70. Id. at 140; see also MICHELLE KAMINSKY, REFLECTIONS OF A DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PROSECUTOR: SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 14 (2012).  As Michelle Ka-
minsky notes:
Prosecutors are public officials who are held publicly accountable.  If a
woman is injured because we failed to follow through on a case, regard-
less of a victim’s wishes, we will be held responsible.  I would be a liar if I
didn’t acknowledge how this truth affects my decision making process.
KAMINSKY, supra, at 14.
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B. No-Drop Prosecution
Prosecutorial zeal in gender violence cases may also be a func-
tion of policies adopted by prosecutors’ offices.  Although as a gen-
eral proposition “[p]rosecutors prosecute,”71 some prosecutors’
offices have adopted specific policies in gender violence cases that
commit them to prosecuting whenever they have sufficient evidence
to do so, regardless of the victim’s wishes.72  These policies are
known as no-drop prosecution policies.
No-drop prosecution grew out of advocacy by the anti-violence
movement in the 1980s challenging the failure of prosecutors to
pursue intimate partner violence cases.73  Prosecutors explained
their failure to bring such cases as a consequence of victims’ reluc-
tance to cooperate with prosecution; without a victim’s testimony,
prosecutors contended that they could not prove the cases beyond a
reasonable doubt.74  As District Attorney Cannizzaro stated,
“Don’t just make a complaint and run away and think magically the
bad guy is going to be automatically convicted and go to jail.  Our
system does not work like that.”75  Prosecutors responded to pres-
sure from anti-violence groups by pledging to push intimate partner
violence cases forward.  First, prosecutors attempted to advance in-
timate partner violence cases by using evidence-based or victimless
prosecution techniques to build cases.76  If such techniques did not
provide sufficient evidence to move forward, prosecutors attempted
to either entice the victim’s cooperation through the provision of
services and support (“soft no-drop prosecution”) or compel victim
participation if the victim’s involvement was deemed necessary to
make the case (“hard no-drop prosecution”).77  In hard no-drop ju-
risdictions, a victim may be required “to sign statements; be photo-
graphed to document injuries; be interviewed by police,
prosecutors, or advocates; provide the State with other evidence or
71. Michelle Madden Dempsey, Toward a Feminist State: What Does “Effec-
tive” Prosecution of Domestic Violence Mean?, 70 MOD. L. REV. 908, 912 (2007).
72. See generally Robert C. Davis et al., A Comparison of Two Prosecution
Policies in Cases of Intimate Partner Violence: Mandatory Case Filing Versus Fol-
lowing the Victim’s Lead, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 633 (2008).
73. See GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 34, at 108–11.
74. Id.
75. Gunter, supra note 25.
76. Evidence-based or victimless prosecution requires law enforcement to col-
lect evidence and build cases involving intimate partner violence as though the
victim of the crime will not be available to testify—much as they do when prose-
cuting a homicide case. GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 34, at
110–11.
77. Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Do-
mestic Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1863 (1996).
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information; produce her children if subpoenaed; and appear in
court throughout the proceedings.  Mandated participation may
also involve forced testimony.”78
Defenders of no-drop prosecution policy argue that the failure
to implement the strongest version of such policies undermines the
legitimacy of state efforts to address gender violence.79  As law pro-
fessor Cheryl Hanna writes, “When a batterer and his defense at-
torney know that a victim’s failure to cooperate may result in case
dismissal, they control the judicial process.”80  Such policies are also
said to help victims of violence recognize the seriousness of the
abuse they face, ensure that scarce state resources are not wasted
on cases that are dropped, deter those who abuse from continuing
to do so, and prevent others in the system, including police officers,
from questioning the need to investigate intimate partner violence
cases.81
Prosecutors in offices with no-drop prosecution policies can
and do pursue cases without the victim’s cooperation, “provided
[they] have sufficient evidence from other sources to establish
guilt.”82  And prosecutors in no-drop jurisdictions stress the impor-
tance of working with the victim to achieve a resolution that satis-
fies both the victim’s wishes and the prosecutor’s responsibilities.83
But no-drop policies can involve putting serious pressure on victims
to testify.  Some prosecutors believe that victims are more likely to
cooperate when victims fear the consequences of ignoring prosecu-
tors’ requests for assistance.  As one prosecutor explained, “I tried
to make [the victim] believe that it would be more painful for them
to not cooperate than it would be to cooperate.”84  Nonetheless, at
least one study suggests that women who have been subjected to
abuse support no-drop prosecution policies.85  Sixty-five percent of
the women surveyed supported no-drop prosecution, although vic-
78. Id. at 1867.
79. See, e.g., id. at 1891–92.
80. Id. at 1891.
81. See id. at 1891–93.
82. Andre L. Taylor, High Point Police Domestic Violence Initiative Gaining
National Attention, WINSTON-SALEM J. (Aug. 4, 2018), https://bit.ly/2HyjvP7
[https://perma.cc/H9RR-TLTF].
83. See, e.g., Barcellos, supra note 65.
84. Kirsch, supra note 67, at 402.
85. See Alisa Smith, It’s My Decision, Isn’t It? A Research Note on Battered
Women’s Perceptions of Mandatory Intervention Laws, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1384, 1398 (2000).
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tims believed that the policies would be more beneficial to others
than to them.86
C. Material Witness Warrants
When victims are unwilling to participate in prosecution, one
powerful tool in the prosecutor’s no-drop arsenal is the material
witness warrant.  The government has long used material witness
warrants to ensure the availability of witness testimony; such war-
rants date back to the Judiciary Act of 1789.87  Modern material
witness laws enable prosecutors to ask law enforcement to arrest
and hold witnesses whose testimony is deemed essential to the pros-
ecution of a case.88  In many states, those detained on material wit-
ness warrants are not entitled to constitutional protections, counsel,
or compensation for their time.89
It is impossible to know how often prosecutors are using mate-
rial witness warrants to arrest and hold victims of gender-based vio-
lence pending the trials of their partners; such cases generally only
come to light when reported by the media.90  Jessica Mindlin of the
86. Id. at 1396. Note, however, that the women were asked to respond to the
following statement: “Some communities have no-drop policies.  A no-drop policy
means that the prosecutor will pursue charges against a defendant in domestic vio-
lence cases even when a victim wants to drop the charges.” Id. at 1400.  No men-
tion seems to have been made of the possibility that the victim could be
subpoenaed, arrested, or incarcerated as a result of no-drop prosecution.  Giving
respondents a fuller understanding of the specifics of no-drop policies might have
changed the results.
87. Carolyn B. Ramsey, In the Sweat Box: A Historical Perspective on the De-
tention of Material Witnesses, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 681, 684 (2009).
88. See generally NAT’L CRIME VICTIM LAW INST., SURVEY OF SELECT STATE
AND FEDERAL MATERIAL WITNESS PROVISIONS (2016), https://bit.ly/2FGjK9c
[https://perma.cc/4DRE-68Q7]. In some states, defendants can also ask that mate-
rial witnesses be held. Id. The decision to hold a material witness can also be
made sua sponte by a judge in some states. See, e.g., Erin Fuchs, Woman Who
Allegedly Endured 2-Day Beating Arrested, Taken to Jail to ‘Save Her Life, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 21, 2013), https://read.bi/2FCT9dg [https://perma.cc/8V7W-3KB6]
(referencing Tennessee Judge Ben McFarlin, who argued that he had victims of
domestic violence arrested and held if they did not come to court because he could
not otherwise connect them with resources); Samantha Michaels, Courts Are Jail-
ing Victims of Sexual Assault: Yes, You Read That Right, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 31,
2016), https://bit.ly/2FMszgS [https://perma.cc/8J8H-TGB2] (describing how a
court ordered Brandy Buckmaster held in an Oregon jail for about 50 days to
ensure that she testified against the prison guard who assaulted her; the guard was
free during that time).
89. Ronald L. Carlson, Distorting Due Process for Noble Purposes: The
Emasculation of America’s Material Witness Laws, 42 GA. L. REV. 941, 946, 952–53
(2008).
90. See, e.g., Barber, supra note 65; Jodie Fleischer, Innocent Victim Speaks
Out About Being Jailed for 17 Days, WSBTV.COM (May 1, 2012), https://2wsb.tv/
2FNAUB9 [https://perma.cc/Y8E3-9QJY]; Nate Morabito, Advocates Horrified
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Victim Rights Law Center believes that while such detentions are
relatively rare, prosecutors have “consistently” used material wit-
ness warrants to hold victims of gender-based violence in some ju-
risdictions, including California, Washington, and Maine.91  But
some prosecutors acknowledge that the aggressive use of material
witness warrants is office policy.  Prosecutor Keith Kaneshiro, who
staunchly defends his office’s no-drop policy, had a woman arrested
at her graduation party in order to ensure her testimony.92  The ac-
tions of other prosecutors make clear that their office policy is to
aggressively seek material witness warrants.  Reporters in Washing-
ton County, Tennessee identified over a dozen victims of intimate
partner violence who were jailed after the victims declined to par-
ticipate in prosecution.  Prosecutor Tony Clark defended the policy,
saying that prosecutors needed to “send a message”: “I’m not going
to go back and apologize for what we’ve done, because I think we
were doing the right thing.  At some point in time, where do we
draw the line in saying that we’re just going to dismiss these cases if
a victim doesn’t appear?”93  Victims often suffer harsh treatment
while incarcerated.  Donna Oliver, one of the Tennessee victims
jailed after failing to appear, alleged that she was “grabbed by both
male and female guards, thrown down, (sprayed), had every ounce
of clothing taken from me, even my glasses. . . . My knees were
badly bruised.  You could see grab marks all over my legs.”94  Cor-
rectional officers concurred that they had used force and chemical
spray against Oliver.95  Notwithstanding Oliver’s claims, Clark de-
nied that the use of arrest was harmful, stating: “Do I think we’re
re-victimizing victims?  No I don’t.”96
Even in jurisdictions where prosecutors acknowledge that ma-
terial witness warrants should be used sparingly, victims of violence
are jailed when prosecutors believe that those victims will not ap-
pear to testify otherwise.  Crystal Rodriguez, for example, failed to
appear for her boyfriend Patrick Iraheta’s court date, despite sign-
ing a subpoena agreeing to appear.97  Rodriguez had told prosecu-
tors that she did not want to testify against Iraheta, who allegedly
“placed his hands on [Rodriguez’s] throat, leaving scratches and red
After Domestic Violence Victims Jailed in Washington County, TN, WJHL.COM
(Sept. 11, 2016), https://bit.ly/2szEpTP [https://perma.cc/979A-CHFN].
91. Michaels, supra note 88.
92. McCray, supra note 66.




97. Fleischer, supra note 90.
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marks.”98  Prosecutors believed that they could not prove their case
against Iraheta without Rodriguez’s testimony.99  DeKalb County,
Georgia, prosecutor Sherry Boston requested a material witness
warrant for Crystal Rodriguez, which ultimately caused Rodriguez
to be held for 17 days.100  Boston justified her action by stating her
belief that Rodriguez would be in “grave danger”101 if the case did
not go forward, given the history of violence in the relationship.  On
the third day of Rodriguez’s incarceration, Iraheta posted bond and
was released.102  Rodriguez’s release was delayed, however, as a re-
sult of issues with scheduling and with the jail, which failed to send
her to a hearing and took four additional days to release her after
being ordered to do so.103  While that delay “concerned” Boston,
she nonetheless continued to justify Rodriguez’s detention because
“we did think it was necessary to get the testimony.”104  Iraheta
later pled guilty, obviating the need for Rodriguez’s testimony.105
Maine prosecutor Maeghan Maloney, who learned about the
use of material witness warrants in a training course for district at-
torneys, said that she wished that she did not have to seek the war-
rants, but must sometimes do so “for the cases where if I didn’t use
it, I’d be in the position of talking about why [the victim] was
killed.”106  Maloney said that she asked for a material witness war-
rant to hold Jessica Ruiz after Ruiz changed her mind about testify-
ing; Ruiz’s lawyer said that Ruiz never received a subpoena in the
case.107
D. Perjury
Some victims, when compelled to testify, choose to recant alle-









106. Barber, supra note 65.  The violence alleged in this case was particularly
serious; Maloney alleged that Robert Robinson hit Jessica Ruiz with a ring, leaving
marks on her body, beat Ruiz with a broom with such force that the broom broke,
and held Ruiz by the throat.  Maloney further alleged that Robinson had dug a
grave for Ruiz before the assault began; when Robinson took Ruiz to see the
grave, she was able to escape. Id.
107. Maloney alleged that Ruiz stopped communicating with prosecutors af-
ter talking with Robinson’s mother and attorney.  Ruiz’s attorney, Lisa Whittier,
said that Ruiz “fully intended to testify” but never received Maloney’s subpoenas,
which, Whittier alleged, were sent to the wrong address. Id.
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tect themselves or their partners.108  Recanting runs the risk of
prosecutorial retaliation.109  In State v. McCaleb,110 for example, the
defendant alleged that his conviction was tainted because prosecu-
tors had threatened to prosecute the complaining witness for per-
jury if she did not testify consistently with her original statement.
Prosecutors allegedly told the victim that she “would need a baby-
sitter for [her] daughter because her dad would be in jail and her
mom would be in jail.”111  In McCaleb, the victim recanted an ear-
lier statement notwithstanding the alleged threat by prosecutors.  It
is impossible to know how often prosecutors make such threats,
what impact they have on victims’ decisions to testify, or how often
prosecutors choose to pursue perjury charges as a result of
recantation.
But prosecutors do use perjury charges to punish victims of vi-
olence for recantation.112  After Deborah Harper testified at her
boyfriend’s criminal trial and denied that her boyfriend had as-
saulted her, prosecutor Sean Daugherty filed perjury charges
against Harper; Harper was incarcerated for 365 days.113  Daugh-
erty explained that while recantation was understandable on a
“human level,” the need for truthful testimony outweighed any con-
cern he had about jailing a victim of violence.114
Similarly, Samantha Adams made a sworn statement in a peti-
tion for an injunction against her husband, but later recanted that
statement and attempted to tell prosecutors and the court that she
wished to rescind her statement.115  After her efforts to rescind
were unsuccessful, Adams signed a second statement in which she
retracted the earlier account and stated that she had been coerced
into making the first statement.116  Adams’s second statement led
108. Njeri Mathis Rutledge, Turning a Blind Eye: Perjury in Domestic Vio-
lence Cases, 39 N.M. L. REV. 149 (2009).
109. Recanting also runs the risk of incurring judicial ire.  When prosecutors
forced Meredith Bell to testify against her boyfriend, Adrian Spraggins, Bell re-
canted her statement.  At trial, Bell testified that her earlier statement was false
and that her trial testimony was accurate.  The judge responded: “So let me see if
I’ve got this all straight.  We’re here trying this case because you are a liar.  Is that
correct?” GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE, supra note 34, at 126–27.
110. State v. McCaleb, 2004-Ohio-5940, 2004 WL 2526406.
111. Id. ¶ 63.  Because the victim recanted her statement nonetheless, the
court found that the alleged threat did not affect Mr. McCaleb’s substantive rights
and therefore did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Id.
112. Kirsch, supra note 67, at 403.
113. Aaron Dome, Domestic Violence Victim Gets Jail for Lying About Beat-
ing, DESERT DISPATCH (Feb. 18, 2011).
114. Id.
115. Adams v. State, 727 So. 2d 983, 983–84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
116. Id. at 984 n.2.
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to the dismissal of the charges against her husband for violating the
injunction.117  Adams, however, was convicted of perjury by contra-
dictory statement; her conviction was upheld on appeal.118  The
court noted “that criminal consequences attach to the false swear-
ing of complaints, even where the affiant might have been moti-
vated by the desire to benefit the person against whom the
complaint was sworn.”119
Concerns about prosecutorial coercion seem to emerge only in
the context of challenges to the convictions obtained as a result of
that coercion.  In State v. Asher,120 for example, Kenneth Asher told
his wife Barbara Haunz-Asher that she should leave the house be-
cause “he might be tempted to hit her.”121  The next day, Haunz-
Asher filed a complaint, and her husband was charged with making
a threat of imminent physical harm.122  When the prosecutor called
Haunz-Asher to testify at trial, she refused to give evidence.  The
prosecutor reportedly was quite angry at Haunz-Asher’s refusal,
asking the trial judge to compel her testimony or find her in con-
tempt.123  Instead, the judge granted a continuance.124  Before the
case came back to trial, Haunz-Asher was subpoenaed to testify
before the grand jury.  The prosecutor told the grand jury:
This lady has filed domestic violence charges against her husband
and then when we got into court she refused to answer any type
of questions about what he had done to her and so the feeling
that I think she gave everybody was that she may have lied on
the affidavit and on her complaint and we just want to get to the
bottom of that so that’s who we are going to bring in now.125
The prosecutor told Haunz-Asher that she had immunity in the
domestic violence case and therefore could not be prosecuted for
falsification, which is the crime that the grand jury was ostensibly
called to investigate.  The prosecutor asked many of the same ques-
tions he had asked at trial, which Haunz-Asher answered.126  When
her husband’s trial resumed, the prosecutor recalled Haunz-Asher
117. Id. at 984 n.3.
118. Id. at 983–84.
119. Id. at 984; see also In re Balliro, 899 N.E.2d 794 (Mass. 2009) (upholding
disciplinary sanction for lawyer who testified untruthfully in domestic violence
matter after telling police and prosecutors that she did not wish to pursue charges).
120. State v. Asher, 679 N.E.2d 1147 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996).




125. Id. at 1150.
126. Id. at 1150–51.
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to the stand and impeached her with her grand jury testimony.127
Asher was convicted of making a threat of imminent physical harm
and appealed the conviction.128
The appellate court noted a number of concerns with the pros-
ecutor’s behavior.  The court began by acknowledging that “frustra-
tion on the part of the prosecution is understandable when one
spouse invokes the help of the criminal justice system against an
allegedly abusive spouse, but then refuses to testify.”129  Despite
the court’s sympathy with the prosecutor’s frustration, particularly
given what the court called its “well-motivated concern for the vic-
tim, the prosecution cannot run roughshod over an accused’s right
to a fair trial, which is what happened in this case.”130  The court
found that the prosecutor’s use of the grand jury “to coerce and
compel the testimony of Haunz-Asher so that the prosecution could
use it in its case against Asher” was improper.131  That coercion, the
court continued, had so colored Haunz-Asher’s testimony that
Asher’s due process rights had been prejudiced.132  The court re-
versed Asher’s conviction.133  Note that the concern here is not with
the way that the victim of this crime was treated by prosecutors,134
but with the impact of that treatment on the defendant’s due pro-
cess rights.  Coercion of victims by prosecutors is acceptable so long
as that coercion does not impair the defendant’s right to a fair trial.
II. VICTIMS OF VIOLENCE AS DEFENDANTS
Prosecutors seem not to care quite as much about the safety
and well-being of victims of violence when those victims become
criminal defendants.  The transformation from victim to defendant
happens, at least in part, because “survival action is often criminal-
ized action.”135  And when victims of violence take action to protect
themselves, they are overcharged, over-sentenced, and denied pa-
role because prosecutors continue to oppose their release, notwith-
standing evidence of victims’ rehabilitation.
127. Id. at 1151.
128. Id. at 1149.
129. Id.
130. Asher, 679 N.E.2d at 1149.
131. Id. at 1150–51.
132. See id. at 1152.
133. Id. at 1153.
134. The court did, however, include a reminder in its opinion that Haunz-
Asher “was the victim in this case, not the accused.” Id. at 1149.
135. Alisa Bierria & Colby Lenz, Battering Court Syndrome: A Structural Cri-
tique of “Failure to Protect”, in THE POLITICIZATION OF SAFETY 91, 91 (Jane
Stoever ed., 2019).
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A. Overcharging and Over-Sentencing
Prosecutors have a tremendous amount of discretion in decid-
ing what charges to bring against those who use violence; there are
few external checks on prosecutorial decisions about charging.136
The charging decision has consequences that ripple throughout the
life of the case, affecting plea bargaining, sentencing, and parole
decisions.  Prosecutors frequently “slap[ ] on a slew of charges,”
bringing charges that they may have little chance of proving beyond
a reasonable doubt, to convince defendants to plead guilty.137  Law
professor John Pfaff writes, “If prosecutors decide to move a case
forward, their choice of what charges to bring is limited solely by
what they think they can prove—or what they think they can con-
vince defendants they can prove.”138  The prosecutor’s choice of a
charge determines the sentencing range the defendant faces.139
And if convicted, inmates are sometimes questioned in post-convic-
tion proceedings about why prosecutors made the choice to charge
one crime over another, the implication being that prosecutors
opted for the more serious charge because the conduct itself war-
ranted a heavier penalty.140
The prosecutorial tendency to charge every conceivable viola-
tion and seek the longest sentence possible holds in cases involving
victims of gender violence who become criminal defendants.  As
Alisa Bierria and Colby Lenz observe, that motivation has driven
the rise of felony murder and aiding and abetting prosecutions
against mothers whose partners harm their children.141  The stories
of Kelly Savage and Tondalo Hall are illustrative.  In 1995, 22-year-
old Kelly Savage was charged with first-degree murder for aiding
and abetting her husband, Mark Savage, in the death of her four-
year-old son, Justin.142  The charge was based on Ms. Savage’s deci-
136. See PFAFF, supra note 68, at 130.
137. See Jordan Smith, If a Prosecutor Breaks the Law in Secret, Does the
Crime Exist? Not According to Texas Prosecutors, INTERCEPT (June 15, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2B7m6tT [https://perma.cc/G3FP-X9B5].
138. PFAFF, supra note 68, at 133.
139. Id. at 131.  Pfaff writes, “I once heard a retired DA tell a conference that
he and his colleagues would figure out what the ‘just’ sentence for a defendant was,
and then try to pick the right set of charges to make sure the judge had to impose
something close to that.” Id.
140. The Maryland Parole Commission, for example, asked one of my clients
why prosecutors had charged her with second-degree murder rather than man-
slaughter, given the underlying facts that she described.  The woman, of course,
could not answer that question.  Her parole was denied.
141. Bierria & Lenz, supra note 135, at 97–98.
142. See id. at 99–100
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sion to leave Justin at home with his father while she ran errands.143
Those errands were part of a safety plan Ms. Savage had developed
with a domestic violence hotline; Ms. Savage was attempting to
leave her husband at the time of Justin’s death.144  Nevertheless, the
prosecution argued that Ms. Savage “directly ‘aided and abetted’”
Mr. Savage in Justin’s death.145  Ms. Savage was convicted of first-
degree murder and sentenced to life without the possibility of
parole.146
Tondalo Hall’s story is similar to Kelly Savage’s story.  Ms.
Hall was 22 years old when her boyfriend, Robert Braxton, broke
their daughter’s toe, leg, and ribs while diapering the baby.147
Braxton had also physically, emotionally, and economically abused
Ms. Hall.148  Braxton was charged with multiple counts of child
abuse, carrying a potential life sentence.149  Prosecutors charged
Ms. Hall with permitting child abuse.150  On October 16, 2006, Ms.
Hall pled guilty to permitting Braxton to seriously harm their chil-
dren and failing to immediately get medical care for the children.151
Ms. Hall agreed to a blind plea, which meant that she was not guar-
anteed a particular sentence but understood that she would receive
a sentence equal to or less than Braxton’s sentence.152  She also
agreed to testify against Braxton.153
Although Ms. Hall asked to be transported to court separately
from Braxton, they were taken to court together; during those
rides, Braxton continued to threaten Ms. Hall.154  Not surprisingly,
Ms. Hall attempted to shield herself from Braxton’s abuse during
the trial.155  Prosecutors were unhappy with Ms. Hall’s testimony,
alleging that she minimized Braxton’s conduct and attempted to
143. Id. at 99.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 99–100.
146. Id. at 100.
147. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3, Hall v. Aldridge, 2017 OK Dist.
Ct. CV-17-67U.
148. Id. at 4–5.
149. Plea of Guilt and Summary of Facts, State v. Braxton, 2006 OK Dist. Ct.
CF-04-6403U [hereinafter Guilty Plea, Braxton], https://bit.ly/2sNTYYg [https://
perma.cc/9KC9-VSG8].
150. Plea of Guilt and Summary of Facts, State v. Hall, 2006 OK Dist. Ct. CF-




153. See Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 147, at 6.
154. Bierria & Lenz, supra note 135, at 105.
155. See Transcript of Formal Sentencing After Previous Plea of Guilty at
11–13, State v. Hall, 2006 OK Dist. Ct. CF-04-6403U, https://bit.ly/2sNTYYg
[https://perma.cc/9KC9-VSG8].
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protect him.156  Fearing that Ms. Hall had undermined their case
significantly, prosecutors entered into a deal with Braxton, who
pled guilty to two counts of child abuse and was sentenced to ten
years imprisonment, with eight years suspended.157
At Ms. Hall’s sentencing hearing, prosecutors were indignant
about Ms. Hall’s testimony.158  Ms. Hall’s defense attorney noted
that Ms. Hall’s testimony was colored by her fear of Braxton.  The
judge acknowledged that Ms. Hall was likely afraid of Braxton,
given the history of Braxton’s violence against Ms. Hall and their
children.159  Nonetheless, and despite the fact that the person who
had actually harmed the children would serve only two years in
prison, prosecutors contended that Ms. Hall “should spend a signifi-
cant part of the rest of her life in prison for what she did to these
children.”160  Ms. Hall was ultimately sentenced to 30 years impris-
onment.161  Braxton had already been released from prison by the
time Ms. Hall was sentenced.162
Prosecutors also overcharge when victims of violence kill their
abusers, often ignoring a documented history of victimization and
treating the victims’ actions as if they did not occur within a context
of violence.  The cases of Arriel Bryant and Jaqueline Dixon are
illustrative.  Arriel Bryant’s partner, Richard Kelley, had been
charged with domestic violence against Bryant three times in seven
years prior to his death and had been convicted twice in 2011 and
2016, respectively.163  Kelley strangled, punched, pushed, and
threatened Bryant, on occasion in front of their children.164  In Sep-
tember 2018, Bryant shot and killed Kelley.165  Despite the long his-
tory of violence Bryant endured, prosecutors charged Bryant with
aggravated murder.  Answering a defense argument that Bryant
represented a classic case of “battered woman syndrome,” prosecu-
156. Id. at 6, 11.
157. Guilty Plea, Braxton, supra note 149.
158. See Transcript of Formal Sentencing After Previous Plea of Guilty, supra
note 155, at 5–8, 10–11.
159. Id. at 12.
160. Id. at 7.
161. Id. at 13.
162. See Guilty Plea, Braxton, supra note 149.
163. Adam Ferrise, Attorney: ‘Classic Case of Battered Women’s Syndrome’
for Cleveland Woman Charged in Deadly Shooting, Amber Alert, CLEVELAND.COM
(Sept. 14, 2018), https://bit.ly/2CLd85s [https://perma.cc/5R6L-25N8].
164. Scott Noll, Mother Charged with Murder Was Victim of Repeated Domes-
tic Abuse, NEWS 5 CLEVELAND (Sept. 12, 2018), https://bit.ly/2DzzDff [https://per
ma.cc/B4V7-BQ3W].
165. Id.
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tor Jose Torres responded that the multiple gunshots justified the
charge and asked for bond of $1 million.166
In July 2018, Jacqueline Dixon shot and killed her husband in
their front yard.167  Ms. Dixon explained that her husband, Carl
Omar Dixon, had charged at her aggressively.  Moreover, Ms.
Dixon had a protection order against her husband, which she ob-
tained in 2016 after he punched her in the face and verbally abused
her.168  Nonetheless, Dallas County District Attorney Michael Jack-
son sought a murder charge before the grand jury because “some-
one got killed.”169  As law professor Angela Davis notes, Jackson
had a number of options other than seeking a murder charge; he
could have sought a lesser charge, or declined to seek charges alto-
gether.170  Even if he had “the evidence to get that indictment, the
question is whether it’s the fair and right thing to do under the
circumstances.”171
Overcharging is at the heart of one of the best-known cases
involving a criminalized survivor—the case of Marissa Alexander.
While Alexander’s case has generated a significant debate about
the gender and racial dimensions of the deployment of “stand-your-
ground” laws,172 the case also illustrates the power of prosecutorial
charging decisions.  In 2012, Alexander was charged with three
counts of aggravated assault for firing a gun into the ceiling of her
home after her ex-husband, Rico Gray, threatened her.173  No one
166. Ferrise, supra note 163.
167. William C. Anderson, Prosecutor Pursues Murder Charge for Woman
Who Defended Herself from Abuser, APPEAL (Aug. 23, 2018), https://bit.ly/
2FNB6B7 [https://perma.cc/KJ3D-6GMU].
168. Police chief Spencer Collier seemed to believe that had Dixon only en-
forced her order, the shooting could have been prevented:
It is pretty clear that the judicial system worked in this situation because
the protection from abuse order was in place.  I am not sure which judge
handled the matter, but I applaud him for doing his job. . . . However, the
order is simply a piece of paper if the complainant does not seek its
enforcement.
Breanna Edwards, Woman Shot and Killed Abusive Husband in Driveway, Now
Faces Murder Charges Even Though Alabama Is a ‘Stand Your Ground’ State,
ROOT (Aug. 3, 2018), https://bit.ly/2SeRH6R [https://perma.cc/E2PL-RXCC].
169. Anderson, supra note 167.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See, e.g., Mary Ann Franks, Men, Women, and Optimal Violence, 2016 U.
ILL. L. REV. 929, 952–54 (2016); Mary Ann Franks, Real Men Advance, Real
Women Retreat: Stand Your Ground, Battered Women’s Syndrome, and Violence as
Male Privilege, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1099, 1118–19 (2014) [hereinafter Franks,
Real Men Advance].
173. Kirsten Powers, Angela Corey’s Overzealous Prosecution of Marissa Al-
exander, DAILY BEAST (July 19, 2013), https://bit.ly/2RPBnK6 [https://perma.cc/
XA92-ZJWE].
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was injured during the incident.174  Gray had a long history of abus-
ing women, including Alexander.175  He admitted to abusing Alex-
ander at least four or five times, including one incident during
which Gray pushed Alexander backwards, causing her to hit her
head on a bathtub, resulting in an injury requiring medical atten-
tion.176  Gray originally testified that, as Alexander had said, he
chased her around the house and was refusing to leave when Alex-
ander fired the gun into the air.177  Alexander turned down the
prosecution’s plea offer of three years imprisonment, went to trial,
was convicted, and was sentenced to 20 years incarceration.178  Af-
ter her conviction was overturned on appeal in 2013, prosecutor
Angela Corey announced her intention to retry Alexander on the
three counts of aggravated assault and to seek consecutive, rather
than concurrent, sentences.179  Facing a possible 60-year sentence,
Alexander agreed to plead guilty to the three counts of aggravated
assault and was sentenced to three years imprisonment, plus an ad-
ditional two years of house arrest and monitoring.180  While some
saw the plea deal as a loss for Angela Corey,181 Corey, in fact, got
everything she had wanted in the original plea deal and more.
In all of these cases, prosecutors could have considered the his-
tory of violence in determining what charges to bring.  That history
could have spurred prosecutors to reduce the charges or not bring
charges at all.  Instead, prosecutors in each case sought the most
serious charges.  In Jacqueline Dixon’s case, the grand jury declined
to indict.  In an unusual move, Ms. Dixon’s lawyers were permitted
to present their version of the facts to the grand jury.182  Given the
174. Id.
175. Franks, Real Men Advance, supra note 172, at 1118.
176. Powers, supra note 173.
177. Gray later changed his story several times.  Amanda Marcotte, Prosecu-
tors Now Seeking a 60-Year Sentence for Marissa Alexander’s Alleged Warning
Shot, SLATE (Mar. 4, 2014), https://bit.ly/2G4t5Hm [https://perma.cc/H22S-GZPE].
178. The resulting 20-year sentence seemed to upset Judge James Daniel, who
noted that as a result of the mandatory minimum sentence, the decision was “en-
tirely taken out of my hands.”  Derek Kiner, How the Marissa Alexander Plea Deal
Really Went Down, FOLIO WKLY. MAG. (Dec. 3, 2014), https://bit.ly/2MHYn8g
[https://perma.cc/5H7G-KMM4].
179. The additional counts were because Gray’s two children were in the
home when the shot was fired.  Marcotte, supra note 177.
180. Sam Sanders, Florida Woman in ‘Stand Your Ground’ Case Accepts Plea
Deal, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 25, 2014), https://n.pr/2HExDXf [https://perma.cc/
KG54-E83Q].
181. Kiner, supra note 178.
182. Carol Robinson, Selma Woman Charged in Husband’s Shooting Death
Cleared by Grand Jury, AL.COM (Oct. 12, 2018), https://bit.ly/2Tg5wih [https://per
ma.cc/SN34-JGF2].  Grand juries are largely seen as tools of the prosecutor; in
some jurisdictions, defense attorneys may not even attend grand jury proceedings,
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influence that prosecutors are widely acknowledged to have with
grand juries,183 a cynic might argue that District Attorney Jackson
allowed the grand jury to hear the defense because Jackson did not
wish to prosecute Ms. Dixon but needed the political cover that the
grand jury provided.  Either way, it is clear that Jackson, like many
prosecutors, declined to use his charging discretion on Ms. Dixon’s
behalf, notwithstanding the evidence of past domestic violence.
The failure to exercise prosecutorial discretion in charging directly
affected the sentences of Kelly Savage, Tondalo Hall, and Marissa
Alexander, and depending upon the outcome of Arriel Bryant’s
case, could have a profound impact on her sentence as well.184
B. Post-Conviction
Post-conviction proceedings provide prosecutors with another
opportunity to exercise discretion in ways that recognize the con-
text within which victims of violence have committed their crimes
or the growth that victims of violence have experienced during in-
carceration.  But some prosecutors are unable to see past the origi-
nal offense and attempt to minimize the violence victims
experienced to block victims’ release from incarceration.185
Again, Kelly Savage’s case is instructive.  Savage was unable to
offer evidence about her own victimization in her 1998 trial.186  In
2002, however, California passed a law enabling victims of violence
to submit writs of habeas corpus in cases where those victims were
unable to submit evidence at trial about “intimate partner battering
and its effects.”187  Savage filed a habeas claim under the new
let alone present evidence. See Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is
There Room for Democracy in the Criminal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 63
(2002).
183. Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the
Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 263 (1995) (explaining that grand juries are
thought to act as a “rubber stamp” for prosecutors, willing to “‘indict a ham sand-
wich’ if asked to do so by the government”).
184. Although my discussion is largely confined to intimate partner violence,
this same phenomenon occurs in the context of human trafficking as well.  Victims
of trafficking who are forced to assist their traffickers are frequently prosecuted
for crimes related to their own trafficking, and prosecutors are often unwilling to
consider that context in charging decisions and sentencing allocutions.  The
Human Trafficking Clemency Initiative, of which I am a part, is working with a
number of these women to seek commutation of excessive and unjust sentences.
185. R. Michael Cassidy, Undue Influence: A Prosecutor’s Role in Parole Pro-
ceedings, 16 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. (forthcoming).
186. Victoria Law, The Abuse Excuse: Dismissing Domestic Violence and Its
Effects in the Criminal Court System, REWIRE.NEWS (Mar. 8, 2017), https://bit.ly/
2nakZRv [https://perma.cc/8U3T-MDQR].
187. Id.
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law.188  All parties agreed that Savage was a victim of violence and
that she had not directly caused her child’s death.189  Nonetheless,
the prosecution continued to contend, as they had at trial, that Sav-
age’s “failure to protect” her child made her as culpable for the
child’s death as her husband, who beat the child to death.190  More-
over, the prosecution minimized the violence that Savage endured,
saying, “While I can respect that someone has been abused in their
life, there are some instances where the law says, I don’t want to be
heartless, but so what, who cares.”191
In a system that rewards prosecutors for convictions and
lengthy sentences,192 prosecutors may consciously or unconsciously
be loath to give up what they see as victories.  As a result, prosecu-
tors actively and passively work to undermine victims’ petitions for
parole and other forms of post-conviction relief.193
III. PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY AND THE LINE BETWEEN
PERMITTED AND ILLEGAL CONDUCT
The prosecutorial behaviors discussed in this Article are prob-
lematic at best, and abusive at worst.  But, with a very few excep-
tions, victims of violence cannot seek redress for this conduct
through the legal system.  Prosecutors are immune from liability for
decisions and conduct related to the initiation and pursuit of a
case.194  Even cases involving dubious prosecutorial behavior are
protected by immunity.
Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for seeking
material witness warrants, even when they make false statements to
188. Id.
189. Bierria & Lenz, supra note 135, at 100.
190. Id. at 101.
191. Id. at 102.
192. Gary Blankenship, Lawyers Must Retain Their Link to the People, FL.
BAR NEWS (Aug. 15, 2005), https://bit.ly/2St853q [https://perma.cc/KPY3-SEMY].
193. I have had this experience in my own practice.  I have attempted to reach
out to my clients’ prosecutors to see if they would be willing to support the clients’
petitions for parole.  In one case, a former prosecutor known for his efforts to
improve Maryland’s parole system on behalf of incarcerated people did not return
my calls asking him to support my client’s petition.  Another former prosecutor
swore that he would work to ensure that my client spent every day of her life in
prison, without hearing about her numerous accomplishments during her incarcer-
ation.  For an argument on limiting the input of prosecutors in parole decisions, see
Cassidy, supra note 185.
194. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S 409, 427–28 (1976); see also Loupe v.
O’Bannon, 824 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2016); Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161 (2d Cir.
2012); Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2011); Flagler v. Trainor, 663 F.3d
543 (2d Cir. 2011).
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secure those warrants.  In Flagler v. Trainor,195 to secure a material
witness warrant so Stephanie Flagler could be held until trial, pros-
ecutor Matthew Trainor allegedly lied in representing to the court
that Flagler was unwilling to testify in a domestic violence proceed-
ing against her ex-boyfriend.196  The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that even if Trainor had, in fact, lied to the
court about Flagler’s willingness to testify, that conduct came
squarely within his “‘function’ as an advocate” and was therefore
immunized.197  The court noted that while prosecutorial immunity
could leave a “genuinely wronged defendant without civil redress
against a prosecutor whose malicious or dishonest action deprives
him of liberty,”198 “society has found more benefit in insulating the
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.”199  Similarly, in Adams v.
Hanson,200 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that
a prosecutor was immune from liability for making allegedly false
statements to support a material witness warrant.201  The plaintiff,
who was six months pregnant, spent 12 days in jail without being
brought before the court.202  Like the Second Circuit, the Sixth Cir-
cuit noted that arguments made to support the request for a mate-
rial witness warrant fall within the prosecutor’s role as advocate for
the state, even when the prosecutor’s statements are false.203  The
Sixth Circuit instead chided the trial court for failing to give Adams
an opportunity to be heard or setting bail before issuing the
warrant.204
Prosecutors have also successfully claimed immunity in cases
where they brought unfounded charges against victims of violence.
In Loupe v. O’Bannon,205 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that a prosecutor was immune from liability for bring-
ing a malicious prosecution against a victim of domestic violence
related to her testimony in another matter.206  In that case, Kristin
195. Flagler v. Trainor, 663 F.3d 543 (2d Cir. 2011).
196. Id. at 546.
197. Id. at 548.
198. Id. at 547 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427–28).
199. Id.
200. Adams v. Hanson, 656 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2011).
201. Id. at 411.
202. Id. at 400.
203. Id. at 405; see also Doe v. Harris Cty., No. H-16-2133 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29,
2017) (dismissing claims against a Harris County prosecutor who allegedly made
false statements to secure material witness warrant against Jane Doe, which re-
sulted in her being incarcerated and assaulted by both inmates and guards).
204. Adams, 656 F.3d at 406.
205. Loupe v. O’Bannon, 824 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2016).
206. Id. at 534
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Loupe’s boyfriend, David Adams Jr., was arrested for assaulting
Loupe.207  Loupe spoke with police at the time of Adams’s ar-
rest.208  At Adams’s bond hearing 18 months later, prosecutors
asked Loupe about the incident.209  Loupe responded that she did
not recall the incident clearly, but that Adams had hurt her arm.210
In response to prosecutor Robin O’Bannon’s questioning, Loupe
denied several times that Adams had hit her in the face.  O’Bannon
asked that Loupe be arrested; the judge refused.211  O’Bannon then
called the officer who took Loupe’s statement to testify; that officer
said that Loupe had never claimed that Adams hit her in the
face.212  O’Bannon ordered a sheriff’s deputy to arrest Loupe for
filing a false police report.213  Loupe was arrested and released that
evening.214  She was charged with criminal mischief for filing a false
police report.215  At trial, prosecutors stipulated that Loupe was not
guilty and Loupe was acquitted.216  Loupe then brought suit against
O’Bannon for malicious prosecution.217  The U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that prosecutors are immune from liability
for “initiating and pursuing a criminal prosecution” even when
prosecutors act “maliciously, wantonly, or negligently.”218
In some cases, courts ratify problematic prosecutorial tech-
niques.  In 2008, Karla Giraldo sought medical care for a cut over
her eye, telling the emergency room doctors that she had been acci-
dentally cut when a glass broke.219  The doctors suspected that
Giraldo had been abused and contacted police.220  The police took
Giraldo against her will to the police precinct.  After holding
Giraldo for five hours, the police took her to the district attorney’s
office, where Giraldo was interrogated for an additional two








215. Loupe, 824 F. 3d at 536.
216. Id. Although prosecutors frequently drop charges, for a variety of rea-
sons, it is uncommon for prosecutors to stipulate that a defendant is not guilty.
217. Id. at 537.
218. Id. at 539, 540 (quoting Rykers v. Alford, 832 F.2d 895, 897 (5th Cir.
1987)).
219. Giraldo v. Kessler, 694 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012).
220. Id. Whether doctors were required to make a report to police is ques-
tionable.  New York law requires that doctors report all potentially life-threatening
injuries inflicted by a knife or other sharp object. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.25
(McKinney 2013).  It is unclear from the facts provided in the case whether
Giraldo’s cut could have been considered life-threatening.
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hours.221  Throughout her time in custody, Giraldo repeatedly as-
serted that she was not interested in participating in prosecution.
That same day, Giraldo’s boyfriend was arrested and arraigned.222
Giraldo sued police and prosecutors, alleging that she had been
“unlawfully detained, held against her will and maliciously interro-
gated.”223  The court found not only that prosecutors were immune
from liability for their actions, but also that the prosecutors had
acted appropriately.224  The court explained:
Once the arrest took place, legal decisions at the core of the
prosecutorial function—pursuit of the charges, arraignment, bail,
etc.—had to be made by appellants and made quickly. . . . Appel-
lee was obviously an important witness with regard to the pro-
ceeding against [Giraldo’s boyfriend].  That she claimed her
injuries resulted from an accident hardly weighed against inter-
viewing her.  Viewing the circumstances objectively, her claim
that her injuries were the result of an accident might well cause a
reasonable prosecutor to believe that interrogation was even
more necessary than would have been the case in more common
circumstances.225
Given the substantial leeway courts have given prosecutors in
determining what constitutes carrying out activities related to the
prosecutor’s role as an advocate, courts frequently immunize what
some would consider prosecutorial misconduct.  As Jessica Ruiz’s
lawyer, Lisa Whittier, explained, Ruiz would not seek redress after
being arrested pursuant to a material witness warrant because Dis-
trict Attorney Maeghan Maloney “abused the material witness stat-
ute, but [the prosecutor] did nothing illegal.”226  The Orleans Parish
District Attorney’s Office’s use of fabricated subpoenas and mis-
leading documents to coerce witness compliance,227 for example,
may well be shielded from liability because the process of securing
witnesses for trial falls within the advocacy function, even if prose-
cutors make false statements in that process.
Absolute immunity may be abrogated only when a prosecu-
tor’s behavior is clearly not undertaken as a function of the prose-
cutor’s role as an advocate, as in S.V. v. Kratz.228  In 2009,
221. Giraldo, 694 F.3d at 164.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 167.
225. Id.
226. Barber, supra note 65.
227. See supra notes 1–32 and accompanying text.
228. S.V. v. Kratz, No. 10-C-0919, 2012 WL 58333185 (E.D. Wis. Nov. 16,
2012).
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Stephanie Van Groll called police after being strangled by her part-
ner.229  District Attorney Kenneth Kratz asked to meet with Van
Groll to discuss the case.230  Shortly after their meeting, Kratz be-
gan texting Van Groll repeatedly, urging her to begin a sexual rela-
tionship with him and “reminding her that he had considerable
money and power as a District Attorney that made a relationship
with him attractive and desirable.”231  Kratz’s texts suggest that his
desire for the relationship and his willingness to pursue Van Groll’s
partner were linked in some way.232  Van Groll feared that “if she
doesn’t do what he wants, Kratz will throw out her whole case.”233
Two additional women came forward with similar claims.234  Kratz
resigned in October 2010, and the suit was settled in 2013.235
Kratz’s case may be the rare case of prosecutorial misconduct in the
context of gender violence that could have resulted in a finding of
liability.
Prosecutorial immunity prevents prosecutors from being held
accountable for behavior ranging from mildly problematic to egre-
gious.  Immunity shields review of decisions about what crimes to
charge and how to ensure that witnesses participate in prosecution.
It likely also emboldens prosecutors, making them more willing to
engage in questionable tactics to secure witness testimony, prevent
recantation, and force plea deals.236  The question, then, is how to
prevent prosecutors from using these tactics.
IV. CORRECTING PROSECUTORIAL OVERREACH
A. Victims as Witnesses
Prosecutors are engaging in behavior that does real harm to
victims of gender-based violence.  But nothing requires that prose-
cutors use material witness warrants aggressively or pursue perjury
charges against witnesses.  Both victims and experts agree that ag-
gressive prosecution policy makes victims of violence less likely to
229. Complaint at 2, S.V. v. Kratz, No. 10-C-0919, 2012 WL 58333185 (E.D.
Wis. Nov. 16 2012).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 3.
232. See id. at 4.
233. Lee Ferran et al., Third Woman Accuses Wisconsin DA of ‘Sexting’ Har-
assment, ABC NEWS (Sept. 21, 2010), https://abcn.ws/2Ut4Giw [https://perma.cc/
3MTB-3UCJ].
234. Id.
235. Associated Press, ‘Sexting’ Lawsuit Against Former Prosecutor Settled,
TWIN CITIES PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 12, 2013), https://bit.ly/2RNU296 [https://perma
.cc/APP3-ZS46].
236. My thanks to Gale Burford for this observation.
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participate and chills reporting in the future.237  As former prosecu-
tor Casey Gwinn notes, forcing victims to participate in prosecution
is “a misuse of the power of the criminal justice system.  Prosecu-
tors across America win these cases without victim testimony.
Cases don’t get better when you jail your victims.”238  Aggressive
prosecution policies defeat their own purpose if they ensure that
victims won’t engage the legal system if violence recurs.  Renata
Singleton, for example, has said that she is unlikely to call police
again if attacked: “I’d rather get choked and survive than go back
to jail.”239  This chilling effect is precisely why the Violence Against
Women Act240 prohibits recipients of federal monies under the Act
from using those funds to support policies or procedures that re-
quire victims to take part in prosecution.241
Some prosecutors are beginning to appreciate the damage
caused by misuse of material witness warrants.  In response to a
particularly egregious misuse of a material witness warrant in a sex-
ual assault case which resulted in the victim being jailed for 27 days
and beaten by guards and inmates, District Attorney Kim Ogg has
discontinued the use of material witness warrants in cases involving
sexual or intimate partner violence.242  Prosecutors could simply
stop seeking material witness warrants in cases involving sexual or
intimate partner violence.  Research suggests that prosecutors
could forgo the use of material witness warrants with little impact
on prosecutorial effectiveness.243
Prosecutors could also change the way in which they concep-
tualize their work to correct prosecutorial overreach.  For example,
law professor Michelle Madden Dempsey has argued that domestic
violence prosecutors should distinguish among types of domestic vi-
olence cases.  Dempsey argues that prosecutors should deploy
mandatory interventions only in those cases where the violence is
serious and ongoing, prosecution is likely to reduce the violence,
the violence perpetuates or sustains patriarchy, and community in-
237. See Alisa Smith, It’s My Decision, Isn’t It?: A Research Note on Battered
Women’s Perceptions of Mandatory Intervention Laws, 6 VIOLENCE AGAINST
WOMEN 1384, 1386 (2000).
238. McCray, supra note 66.
239. Stillman, supra note 5.
240. Violence Against Women Act, 34 U.S.C. §§ 12291–12512 (2018).
241. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, OVW
FISCAL YEAR 2018 STOP FORMULA GRANT PROGRAM SOLICITATION (2018); Nate
Morabito, Domestic Violence Grant Prohibits Washington County from Forcing
Victims to Participate in Criminal Cases, NEWS CHANNEL 11 (Sept. 14, 2016),
https://bit.ly/2Hzse3M [https://perma.cc/5F68-MUWZ].
242. Gunter, supra note 25.
243. Davis et al., supra note 72.
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terests are served by compelling the victim’s testimony.244  Others
have suggested increasing victim agency in prosecution by soliciting
victim input into decisions about whether to proceed or providing
victims who choose to prosecute with support services, rather than
forcing or coercing participation.245  Prosecutor Michelle Kaminsky
endorses this approach.  Kaminsky recounts a case in which her in-
sistence on pursuing prosecution over the victim’s opposition was
based not on Kaminsky’s assessment of what the impact might be
on the victim, but because “I just didn’t want a smug defendant like
Seth to get away with what he had done.”246  In retrospect, Kamin-
sky writes, she should not have pursued the case.247  Kaminsky ar-
gues that “prosecutors need to start incorporating battered women
into the decision making process by listening to their wants and
needs.  While prosecution may be appropriate in some cases, it may
not be the best approach in all cases.”248
Legislatures and courts could also enact safeguards against
misuse of prosecutorial power.  New York, for example, recently
created an independent commission to investigate claims of
prosecutorial misconduct.249  But, as commentators have noted,
such a commission may have little impact given that much question-
able prosecutorial behavior does not constitute misconduct.250
Moreover, oversight bodies are embedded in a system that contin-
ues to immunize most prosecutorial actions from liability because it
assumes that the vast majority of prosecutors are “acting in the
244. MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 208 (2009).
245. See, e.g., Mary A. Finn, Evidence-Based and Victim-Centered
Prosecutorial Policies: Examination of Deterrent and Therapeutic Jurisprudence Ef-
fects on Domestic Violence, 12 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 443, 450 (2013); see
generally Lauren Bennett Cattaneo et al., The Victim-Informed Prosecution Pro-
ject: A Quasi-Experimental Test of a Collaborative Model for Cases of Intimate
Partner Violence, 15 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1227 (2009) (having empowering
experiences with court processes has been linked to improvements in victims’ well-
being); Lauren Bennett Cattaneo & Lisa A. Goodman, Through the Lens of Ther-
apeutic Jurisprudence: The Relationship Between Empowerment in the Court Sys-
tem and Well-Being for Intimate Partner Violence Victims, 25 J. INTERPERSONAL
VIOLENCE 481, 499 (2010).
246. MICHELLE KAMINSKY, REFLECTIONS OF A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSE-
CUTOR: SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 58 (2012).
247. Id.
248. Id. at 15.
249. Editorial Bd., Prosecutors Need a Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2018),
https://nyti.ms/2Pc0aDh [https://perma.cc/JSA8-6KWP].
250. See Maura Ewing, New York’s Prosecutorial Misconduct Review Panel
Could Be Groundbreaking, SLATE (Aug. 28, 2018), https://bit.ly/2wtSgxb [https://
perma.cc/B4GK-RY3U].
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public interest.”251  And after-the-fact scrutiny requires that those
with the least power in the system—victims and defendants—raise
claims of prosecutorial misconduct.252
There are, however, practices that courts could put into place
to prevent misuse of material witness warrants.  The constitutional
protections that attach after a criminal defendant’s arrest are not
available to those held on material witness warrants in most
states.253  Recall what Renata Singleton was told: “You’re the vic-
tim.  You don’t get a lawyer.”254  But states could provide such pro-
tections.  District Attorney Kim Ogg has championed Jenny’s
Law,255 which entitles victim witnesses in Texas to be represented
by a public defender and to a prompt court appearance when the
victim witness is threatened with jail.256  Ogg argues:
We need to ensure that when we use such a powerful tool as de-
priving someone of their liberty we give them a chance to re-
spond, in person, with counsel, in open court, and ensure that
process is scrutinised [sic].  These are basic rights that are given
to the accused.  They should be given to the victim too.257
Moreover, rather than giving the benefit of the doubt to prose-
cutors asking for material witness warrants, courts should examine
such requests carefully and require prosecutors to justify the issu-
ance of a warrant.258
B. Victims as Defendants
Tackling the problem of prosecutorial discretion in charging,
sentencing, and post-conviction is equally difficult.  Prosecutors
251. Smith, supra note 137.
252. Id.
253. Gunter, supra note 25.  The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution,
for example, ensures that criminal defendants understand their right to remain si-
lent and to have an attorney present during interrogation. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a speedy trial and to be informed of
the nature and cause of any charges brought against the criminal defendant. U.S.
CONST. amend. VI.  And the Eighth Amendment requires that after arrest, a crimi-
nal defendant have access to non-excessive bail. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
254. Stillman, supra note 5.
255. Jenny’s Law was passed by the Texas legislature and signed by the gover-
nor in 2017.  The provisions are incorporated in various sections of the Texas Code
of Criminal Procedure. See S.B. 291, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2017).
256. Id.
257. Gunter, supra note 25.
258. Id. Judge Laurie White, who issued a material witness warrant that
placed a key witness in a murder case in the same jail as the alleged murderer after
being misled by Orleans Parish prosecutors about the need to secure his testimony,
says that, as a result, she is “not so quick to issue any material witness bond re-
quested by the DA’s office until I find out more.” Id.
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could refrain from aggressively pursuing victims of violence who
use violence against their partners, a choice law professor Michelle
Madden Dempsey refers to as “non-pursuit.”259  Prosecutors could
interpret the law of self-defense through a lens that appreciates how
that body of law is gendered and make decisions about the amount
of force used or the imminence of harm accordingly.260  Prosecutors
could stop using felony murder laws to punish victims of violence
for unwitting, minimal, or after-the-fact involvement in crimes of
violence perpetrated by the victims’ partners and others.261  Prose-
cutors could choose to treat cases where the defendant is also de-
monstrably the victim of violence, and that victimization is directly
tied to the crime at issue, differently.
Until prosecutors change their behavior, communities that care
about misuse of prosecutorial discretion can call attention to cases
where prosecutorial power has been wielded unwisely or unfairly.
Campaigns like Free Marissa Now262 and #FreeBresha263 brought
widespread public attention to the plights of Marissa Alexander
and Bresha Meadows, a 14-year-old girl charged with killing her
father after suffering years of his abuse.  Outlets such as #Survive-
dandPunished continue to document the stories of other women,
like Tondalo Hall, who remain in prison.264  Efforts like these help
to illuminate the scope of the problem of criminalized survivors and
create public pressure for prosecutors to rethink overzealous charg-
ing and sentencing decisions.
259. Dempsey, supra note 71, at 913.
260. See generally CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BAT-
TERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW (1989).
261. See, e.g., Danny Wicentowski, Angel Stewart Won Parole in Missouri. She
Still Has a Second Life Sentence in Iowa, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018),
https://bit.ly/2MAaggr [https://perma.cc/T64G-HKMM].
262. See FREE MARISSA ALEXANDER, https://bit.ly/2G9jDT2 [https://perma
.cc/NJY7-BYJV].
263. See #FREEBRESHA, https://bit.ly/2d5qP3b [https://perma.cc/JHM6-
SBVC]. Bresha Meadows was 14 years old when she killed her father after suffer-
ing years of his abuse.  She was charged with murder and, if she had been tried as
an adult, could have received a life sentence.  Instead, she pled guilty to involun-
tary manslaughter in the juvenile system.  Meadows was released in 2017 after
serving one year in a juvenile detention center and six months in a mental health
facility.  Mariame Kaba & Colby Lenz, Bresha Meadows Returns Home After Col-
lective Organizing Efforts, TEEN VOGUE (Feb. 5, 2018), https://bit.ly/2SaAVFL
[https://perma.cc/AS6H-EPGZ].
264. See SURVIVED & PUNISHED, https://bit.ly/2MxK8Te [https://perma.cc/
65K6-SLWG].
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CONCLUSION
Renata Singleton is the named plaintiff in a class action lawsuit
challenging District Attorney Cannizzaro’s policy of using fake sub-
poenas to coerce victim participation and lying to courts about vic-
tims’ violations of those fake subpoenas in order to justify the
issuance of material witness warrants.  Catina Curley was acquitted
on March 1, 2019, after spending ten years in prison.265  The
chances that prosecutors will be disciplined or held liable in any
way for either of these decisions are slim.  But the fact that neither
of these actions may constitute prosecutorial misconduct doesn’t
make them acceptable.  Prosecutors should use their discretion in
gender violence cases—in all cases—to do justice.266  Against a
backdrop of mass incarceration and the increasing criminalization
of victims of gender violence, we, as a society, should demand no
less.
265. Heather Nolan, Judge Finds Catina Curley, Recently Granted New Trial
for Killing Husband in 2005, Not Guilty, NOLA.COM (Mar. 1, 2019), https://bit.ly/
2CNxSu6 [https://perma.cc/9XLF-Y685].
266. See Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 3, 4 (1940).
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